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CASENOTE
Expanding the Boundaries of Equality: Taking Pregnancy Into Account in California
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra' — More than ever before in our nation's
history, women in America are working outside the home. Women also continue to enter
the work force in record numbers. Currently, nearly 54% of all women works and female
workers constitute over 42% of the nation's total work force.' It is estimated that two-
thirds of the new workers to enter the job market through 1995 will be women. 4
Inevitably, many working women will become pregnant and bear children while partic-
ipating in the paid work force.'
The rights of pregnant workers is not a new question, but the sheer number of
working women and the importance of their role both in the nation's economy and in
the economic well-being of their families gives the question an urgency and universality
today that is new.° Recent developments in the area of pregnancy discrimination may
provide some solutions for the problems faced by so many pregnant workers. Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress has outlawed discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy.' In addition, more and more private employers are providing preg-
nancy disability leave and parental leave for their employees." Furthermore, several state
legislatures have enacted laws that provide job protection for pregnant workers. 9 Most
I California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
2 WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE FOR WOMEN, 1976-
1985: EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (July 1985) [hereinafter DECADE FOR WOMEN), cited
in Brief of Amid Curiae — California Women Lawyers, al 5, California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987), aff 'g 758 F.2(1 391) (9111 Cir. 1985).
5 Larwood & Clack, Women at Wotk in the USA, in WOMEN: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY 237 (M,
Davidson & C. Cooper eds. 1984). Larwood and Gutek note that this figure represents an increase
from 29.6% in 1950. Id.
Dwyer, Business Starts Tailoring Itself to Suit Working Women, Bus. WK., Oct. 6, 1986, at 50,
Dwyer notes that "ltiwo-thirds of the 15 million new entrants into the job market through 1995
will be WOIDCD, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics .. , and in terms of sheer numbers, they
will have inure influence than ever before." Id. at 50-51.
Studies estimate that 85% of the women currently working will have a child while in the labor
force. W. Chavkin, Walking A Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting and Work 206, in Douai.% EXPOSURE,:
WOMEN'S HEAULII HAZARDS ON THE JOB AND AT HOME (1984), cited in Brief of Atnici Curiae —
California Woolen Lawyers, supra note 2, at 7.
6 The working woman's income is essential to the maintenance of her family. Recent studies
have shown that 60% of working women report that they must work to support themselves or their
families, that women head 16% of all families and 61% of these women are in the work force, and
that the income of married women who work full time accounts for approximately 40% or their
family income. Brief of Amid .' Curiae — California Women Lawyers, supra note 2, at 7-8 (citing
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, WOMEN AND MONEY 30 (1984) and DECADE FOR WOMEN,
supra note 2, at 25).
7 42 U,S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1985). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) amended
Title Vll in 1978 to prohibit discrimination based on pregnancy. See infra note 15 for the text of
the PDA.
" See Dwyer, Business Starts, supra note 4, at 50.
9 Four states, California, Connecticut, Montana, and Massachusetts, currently have statutes
which require that employers provide reasonable pregnancy disability leave with limited job pro-
tection for pregnant workers. See CAL. Gov .'''. Cons: § 12945(h)(2) (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7) (West Supp. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 1050 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1986): MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-310 and 49-2-311 (1985).
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recently, the United States Supreme Court ruled that in order to further Title VI l's goal
of equal employment opportunity for women, pregnant workers can receive special
treatment in the form of limited job protection not available to other temporarily disabled
workers.")
In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra," Lillian D. Garland wished
to return to her job after a four-month pregnancy disability leave.' 2 When her employer,
California Federal Savings and Loan (Cal Fed), refused to rehire her, Garland sought
the protection of California's "right to return" law. 13
 This statute requires employers to
grant a pregnant employee up to four months of unpaid disability leave and to rehire
her in the same or a similar position at the end of the leave." Cal Fed challenged the
validity of the statute in federal district court, asserting that Title VII, as amended by
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)," pre-empted the California law because the
PDA prohibits any special treatment on the basis of pregnancy. 16 The Supreme Court
rejected this interpretation of the PDA, however, and upheld California's "right to
return" law. The Court ruled that because both Title VII, as amended by the PDA, and
California's right to return law share the common goal of ensuring equal employment
opportunity for women, and because the California law limits special treatment to just
the period of actual physical disability resulting from pregnancy and childbirth, Title
VII does not pre-erupt the California statute."
In ruling that California's right to return law is not inconsistent with the PDA, the
Supreme Court has resolved the confusion among the lower courts concerning the
California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987), aff'g 758 F.2d 392 (9th
Cir. 1985).
"
2 Id. at 688.
' 3 Id.
' 4 CAL. Gov •t. CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1986). Initially codified as 1420.35 of the California
Labor Code, the law now appears as part of the California Government Code and reads, in pertinent
part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona fide occupational
qualification: .. . (b) For any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions ... (2) To take a leave on
account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time; provided, such period shall not
exceed four months .... Reasonable period of time means that period during which
the female employee is disabled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.
Id.
15 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amended Title VII so that the definition of sex
discrimination would include pregnancy discrimination:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted
to permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1985).
'" California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
17 Id. at 693-94.
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proper interpretation of the PDAI 8 and established a test for states to follow in deter-
mining the validity of some kinds of pregnancy discrimination legislation." By permitting
states, in the Court's words, to "tak[e] pregnancy into account"20 in order to protect
women workers, the Court has indicated that state legislation requiring the special
treatment of pregnancy will he permitted when it. meets a two-pronged test. Under this
test, the state must first limit the special treatment to just the period of actual physical
disability resulting from pregnancy and childbirth and, second, the special treatment
must enhance the woman worker's employment opportunity.!' The Court's test expressly
rests on a simple and fundamental concept: women, as well as men, should be able to
have families without facing the risk of losing their jobs. 22
The Court formulated this two-pronged test after determining that the pre-emptive
reach of Title VII, as amended by the PDA, is severely lirnitecl. 2 S When it enacted Title
VII, Congress explicitly stated that the federal law would not disturb existing state fair
employment laws. 24 When the Court resolved the pre-emption issue by finding Califor-
nia's right to return law in harmony with the PDA, it provided both a sound, workable
test by which to judge the legality of existing pregnancy discrimination statutes, and a
model for states that might wish to follow California's lead. By articulating the case's
underlying issue as one of equality between working women and working men with
families, the Court provided not only a sensible framework with which to analyze the
problem of pregnancy discrimination, but also demonstrated that the idea of equality in
American law has continuing vitality and can respond to the needs of a changing world.
The California Federal case arose from a labor dispute between Lillian D. Garland
and the California Federal Savings and Loan Association (Cal Fed). In January 1982,
Garland, a Cal Fed receptionist/PBX operator, began a pregnancy disability leave. 25
Three months later Garland notified Cal Fed that she was ready to return to work. 2° Cal
Fed advised Garland that no receptionist or similar positions were available at that time
and that a permanent employee had filled her previous position." Garland did not
return to work until November 1982, when she accepted a position as a receptionist in
Cal Fed's Accounting Department. 28
" The lower courts have been far from consistent in their interpretation of the PDA. Some
courts have adopted an equal treatment approach to pregnancy, others have required different
treatment, and still others have found that the PDA permits, but does not require special treatment.
See Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Cocust. L. REV. 690, 699-703
(1983) for a summary of these cases. These different interpretations of the PDA mirror the debate
among various commentators concerning the treatment of pregnancy in the workplace. Sec infra
notes 120-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of what is decribed as the equal treatment/
special treatment debate.
19 See California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 694.
SO id .
s r
22 Id.
25 Id. at 690.
2 '1 Id. (citing Shaw v, Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U,S. 85,103 n.24 (1983)).
25 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
26 Id.
27 California Fed, Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empi. Prat:. Cas. (BNA) 562, 565 (D.C.
Cal. 1984) (California Federal I), rev'd, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985) (California Federal II), aff 'd, 107
S. Ct. 683 (1987) (California Federal).
29 Id.
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In May 1983, the California Department of Fair Employment and 1-lousing 29 served
a complaint against Cal Fed on Garland's behalf." The complaint alleged that Cal Fed's
disability leave policy violated California's pregnancy discrimination law because it failed
to provide Garland with four months of pregnancy disability leave and reinstatement to
the same or a similar job, as the statute required. ," Cal Fed then filed suit in federal
district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the
California statute on the grounds that Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act (PDA), pre-empted the statute." The district court held that federal law pre-
empted the California law because the statute required "preferential" treatment of
pregnancy-related disabilities, while the PDA required that employers treat pregnancy
disability the same as other temporary disabilities." The court concluded that because
female employees received a benefit that male employees did not receive, the special
treatment of pregnancy made employers vulnerable to "reverse discrimination" suits by
male employees under Title VI1. 54
"Fhe Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling
and stated that the district court's conclusion that the California statute discriminates
against males "defies common sense, misinterprets case law, and flouts Title VII and the
PDA."35
 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Title VII, as amended by the PDA, and
California's right to return law share a common goal: to achieve equal employment
opportunity for women." The PDA establishes a minimum level of protection for preg-
nant workers, the Ninth Circuit found, when it requires that employers treat pregnant
workers the same as other workers similar in their ability or inability to work." The
Ninth Circuit stated, however, that this minimum level of protection does not prevent
states from doing more for pregnant workers if they wish." Cal Fed appealed and the
29 The California Department of Fair Employment and Housing is the administrative agency
charged with the enforcement of the Fair Employment and I-lousing Act, of which § 12945(b)(2) is
a part. California Federal I, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 565.
'" California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
" California Federal II, 758 F.2d at 392. Cal Fed's disability leave policy is reproduced in the
district court's opinion, as follows:
(a) An employee must have completed the third month of employment in order
to be eligible,
(b) To ensure continuous workflow, the position the employee is vacating may
have to be filled. If this happens, the Personnel Division will make every effort to
provide another, similar or suitable position. Under no circumstances may an
employee return before contacting the Employment Department to find out
whether a position is available.
(c) Cal Fed reserves the right to terminate an employee on leave of absence if a
similar and suitable position is not available.
California Federal I, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 565.
32 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
33 Id.
" California Federal 1, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 568.
" California Federal II, 758 F.2d at 393.
56 Id. at 396.
37 Id.
." Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that "the reasons for the PDA's enactment ... [make] clear that
Congress intended ... to construct a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not
drop — not a ceiling above which they may not rise." Id.
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United States Supreme Court, in a six to three opinion, affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
holding."
The Supreme Court sustained California's right to return law against Cal Fed's Title
VII pre-emption challenge because the Court found no direct conflict between the state
and federal statutes. 4° The Court reasoned that the goal of both the PDA, as evidenced
by its legislative history, and the California statute is to achieve equal employment
opportunity for women." Title VII permits the special treatment of pregnancy to achieve
this goal, the Court ruled, when it meets a two-pronged test. First, the state law must be
narrowly tailored to cover just the period of actual physical disability resulting from
pregnancy and childbirth. Second, it must enhance employment opportunity for the
pregnant worker. 42 Thus, according to the Court, Title VII will not pre-empt state law
providing for special treatment of pregnant workers when it conforms to this test.
In California Federal, the Supreme Court demonstrated great sensitivity to the needs
of pregnant women in the workplace. The Court properly upheld a California law giving
limited job protection to pregnant workers. It based its decision not on a paternalistic
concerti for the "weaker sex" but, rather, on an awareness that without this protection
many women must choose between having families and keeping their jobs. 45 The decision
is not only a victory for California and three other states with similar legislation," but
also a victory for all the nation's working women. The job protection now found per-
missible under federal law opens a door for all states to follow California's lead.
Section I of this casenote will trace the foundations of pregnancy discrimination law
and examine the early Supreme Court cases that upheld protective legislation for
women,15 the modern pregnancy discrimination cases,'" and the enactment of the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act and California's right to return law.° Section I then will
examine the current public policy debate concerning pregnancy discrimination in the
workplace by surveying the viewpoints of both the "equal treatment" 48 and the "special
treatment" advocates,49 who propose very different solutions to the problems faced by
pregnant workers. Section II will present the Supreme Court's opinion in California
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra," including both the concurring 51 and dis-
senting opinions.52 Section III will analyze the soundness of the Court's reasoning and
California Federal, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined
Justice Marshall's majority opinion. justices Scalia and Stevens contributed concurring opinions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell joined Justice White's dissenting opinion,
4D Id. at 692.
" Id. at 693.
42 Id. at 694.
" One court has observed that these statutes assist women's "participation in the job market by
insuring that they will not be fired solely because they become pregnant." Miller-Wahl Co. v.
Commissioner of Labor & Indus., State of Mont., 515 F. Supp. 1264,1268 (1). Mont. 1981).
44 See supra note 9 for a listing of the state legislation of Connecticut, Montana, and Massachu-
setts.
45 See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 66-95 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 96-119 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
s° See infra notes 142-80 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 181-95 and accompanying text.
52 Sec infra notes 196-209 and accompanying text.
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examine both the legal and public policy implications of the Court's opinion. 53 Finally,
Section 111 will conclude that the Court properly decided California Federal and, in the
process, established a sensible model for the protection of pregnant employees in the
workplace that enlarges traditional notions of equality. 54
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION LAW
Pregnancy discrimination law has its roots in the early sex discrimination cases. 55
Courts upheld "protective" and paternalistic legislation for women based primarily on
the view that women's childbearing ability made them vulnerable to potential dangers
in the workplace. The protective legislation, however constitutional, limited women's
access to the workplace. As a result of this history, modern plaintiffs sought equal
treatment as the remedy for pregnancy discrimination. Only when this approach failed
to protect pregnant women in the workplace did the law come full circle to a new
protective approach.
Historically, society viewed a woman's capacity to bear children as something that
made her different from the typical worker, usually a man. 56 Women's "difference" was
seen as a frailty or a weakness that made them less able to handle the rigors of the
working world. This view prompted restrictive legislation that many considered necessary
for the protection of women in the workplace. In the 1873 case of Bradwell v. Illinois,"
for example, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a state court ruling that pro-
hibited Myra Bradwell's admission to the state bar. Justice Bradley reflected the judicial
attitude of the time when he observed, in . his concurring opinion, that the legal profession
was particularly ill-suited for the sex whose "paramount destiny and mission ... are to
fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and rnother." 58 Justice Bradley explained that
"the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex"59 neces-
sitated upholding the state court's ruling. Thus, in an effort to "protect" 6° a woman who
evidently had sufficient courage and strength to pursue a career then considered inap-
propriate for her sex, the Court in effect prohibited her from earning a livelihood in
the manner she chose.
This concern for the protection of the weaker sex influenced the court for almost
a century. The Supreme Court's 1905 decision of Lochner v. New York61 struck down
protective labor legislation for bakers — who were primarily male — on the theory that
a law limiting work hours interfered with a worker's right to contract and sell his labor
in any manner he wished. Just three years later, however, the Court upheld similar
55 See infra notes 210-75 and accompanying text.
"Id.
" This casenote uses the term "pregnancy discritnination law" to describe the entire body of
law that has developed concerning pregnancy discrimination, including both case law and statutory
enactments.
56 See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW:
CAUSES AND REMEDIES 19-53 (1975) for a discussion of this period in history.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
58 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
"Id. (Bradley, J., concurring).
Id. (Bradley, J., concurring).
61
 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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legislation in Muller v. Oregon52 that applied to female workers in factories and laundries.
The Court did not, view the Muller issue as touching the right to contract; rather, the
Court found that the "burdens of motherhood" placed women at a competitive disad-
vantage in the workplace." 3 Once again, the Court found that women's natural weakness,
the ability to bear children, justified a statute limiting the work hours, and consequently
the pay, of female workers." The Court in Muller perceived women workers as so
different from men that it determined that Lochner's reasoning did not apply; nor did
the Court recognize that the women workers had any contractual rights which the statute
may have in fringed. 65
These early cases indicate that when the Court took into account women's capacity
to become pregnant, this consideration often resulted in setbacks for women both eco-
nomically and in the choice of occupations." Historically, therefore, the "special treat-
ment" of pregnancy constricted the employment opportunities available to women. Not
surprisingly, modern plaintiffs sought equal treatment as a remedy for discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy." Because employers treated pregnancy differently than other
temporary disabilities by excluding it from disability benefit plans, these plaintiffs urged
that pregnancy should receive equal treatment in the workplace so that pregnant workers
could receive the same benefits as other temporarily disabled workers."
The first pregnancy discrimination case to reach the Supreme Court involved a
Cleveland Board of Education policy that required pregnant teachers to begin maternity
leave five months before the expected date of birth. 69 In addition, the policy permitted
teachers to return to the classroom only after the infant reached three months of age
and the teacher submitted a letter from her physician attesting to her "physical condi-
tion."0 The plaintiffs in the 1974 case Of Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur chal-
lenged this policy on due process grounds. 71 The Court found that the policy violated
the pregnant teachers' due process rights because no rational basis existed for the school
board's conclusion that the teachers were physically incapable of teaching after the fourth
62 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
" Id. at 121.
" Id.
" Id, at 422.
"" Other influential cases involving restrictive protective legislation include 110)1 v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding state statute excluding women from jury selection lists) and Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding state statute prohibiting women from tending bar).
67 See Nashville Gas Co. v, Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (plaintiffs claimed loss of seniority and
exclusion of pregnancy coverage from disability benefits plan violated Title VII); General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (plaintiffs claimed exclusion of pregnancy coverage from disability
benefits plan violated Title VI 1); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (plaintiffs claimed exclusion
of pregnancy coverage from disability benefits plan violated  equal protection clause); Cleveland
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (plaintiffs claimed mandatory pregnancy leave violated
due process clause).
6' Sec infra notes 69-95 and accompanying text for a discussion'of these cases.
"9 Lafleur, 414 U.S. at 635 n.1.
7° Id.
7' A second consolidated case challenged a similar policy on equal protection clause grounds.
See Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The Court decided LaFleur on
due process clause grounds and therefore did nut reach the equal protection clause issue in either
LaFleur or Cohen, LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 652 (Powell, J., concurring).
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month of pregnancy," or that they would be unable to return to the classroom until
three months after childbirth.73 The Court also found that the mandatory leave policy
unconstitutionally interfered with a woman's right to decide to bear children:74 .
Later that same year, in Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court determined the status of
pregnancy discrimination under the equal protection clause." The Geduldig plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of California's disability insurance program, which com-
pensated workers for virtually every temporary disability except pregnancy and preg-
nancy-related conditions- 76 The state argued that providing coverage for pregnancy-
related disabilities was simply too costly for the program." The Court held that the
disability plan was not discriminatory." The Court reasoned that because both women
and men received identical coverage under the plan," and because those employees who
would not seek pregnancy coverage included both women and men, 8° the state's decision
to exclude pregnancy coverage from the plan was not sex-based." Thus, the Court ruled
that prenancy coverage exclusion did not constitute "invidious" discrimination as re-
quired to invalidate the disability plan on equal protection grounds.B 2
After the mixed results in LaFleur and Geduldig, Title VII became the vehicle for
plaintiffs challenging discrimination on the basis of pregnancy." The first case to reach
the Supreme Court with a pregnancy discrimination claim based on Title VII was the
1976 case of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert." The Gilbert plaintiffs charged that General
Electric's sickness and accident leave policy violated Title VII because it excluded any
72 Id. at 646.
75 Id. at 648.
74 Id. at 650.
75 417  U.S. 484 (1974).
76 1d. at 490.
77 Id. at 493. The state asserted that "coverage of these disabilities is so extraordinarily expensive
that it would be impossible to maintain a program supported by employee contributions if [preg-
nancy-related] disabilities are included." Id. In reality, however, the cost of pregancy disability
coverage was far lower than predicted. The PDA's legislative history reported the following in 1978:
Generally, it is not anticipated that disability benefit costs will rise substantially [once
pregnancy coverage is required]. For instance, California's disability insurance pro-
gram for pregnant women, enacted in 1976, and providing for benefits for 3 weeks
prior to delivery and 3 weeks after, has given the State a $52 million surplus. Califor-
nia's experience shows that only $13.2 million in benefits were claimed in 1977 al-
though payroll taxes to pay for the program raised $65.3 million. Only 40,708 claims
were filed for benefits instead of 115,000 expected and the average benefit paid to
women was less than predicted.
H. R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4749, 4758.
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494.
79 Id. at 496-97. The Geduldig Court stated, "Where is no risk from which men are protected
and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not."
Id. The Court failed to realize that the plan fully covered male sex-specific illnesses and disabilities.
Williams, Equality's Riddle, infra note 122, at 343.
B° Justice Stewart described the group of employees who would not seek pregnancy coverage
as "nonpregnant persons," because it included both men and women. Id. at 496 n.20.
Id.
82 Id. at 494.
" MOMS, Different Treatment of Pregnancy in Employee Disability Benefit Programs: Title VII and
Equal Protection Clause Analysis, 60 OR. L. REV. 249, 253 (1981).
" 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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coverage for "absences due to pregnancy or resulting childbirth or to complications in
connection therewith." 85 The Court sustained General Electric's disability policy for the
same reason that it upheld the disability plan in Geduldig: 86 the plan's pregnancy exclusion
did not constitute invidious discrimination because it divided recipients into the permis-
sible categories of pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. 87
The Court adopted this interpretation of Title VII because it concluded that Con-
gress had, at least to some extent, incorporated the Court's equal protection clause
analysis into the statute when it was enacted. 88 Because Title VII, in the Court's view,
included this equal protection analysis, the Geduldig decision disposed of the Gilbert
claims.89 The Gilbert ruling, therefore, limited Title VII's effectiveness against pregnancy
discrimination just as the Geduldig ruling previously limited the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court's second Title VII-based pregnancy discrimination case was the
1977 case of Nashville Gas Go. v. Satty, 9° and it seemed to evince a more sympathetic
handling of pregnancy discrimination claims. The Salty plaintiffs challenged two aspects
of the Nashville Gas Company (Nashville) policy concerning pregnancy: mandatory
unpaid leave for all pregnant employees and loss of all job seniority by anyone who took
pregnancy leave.• 1 The Court found the company's policy of not granting disability pay
to pregnant employees on leave "legally indistinguishable" from the disability program
upheld in Gilbert and thus permissible under Title VII. 92 The Court broke with its
GeduldiglGilbert analysis, however, and found sex discrimination in Nashville's policy of
revoking the job seniority of those employees on pregnancy leave. 95 This policy clearly
violated Title VII, the Court found, because it denied pregnant employees future em-
ployment opportunities at Nashville.''" The loss of seniority policy was also distinguishable
front Gilbert, according to the Court, because it did more than simply fail to provide a
benefit for pregnant employees; it "burdened" female employees in a way that similarly
situated male employees were not burdened. 99
When the Supreme Court ruled in Gilbert that excluding pregnancy coverage from
a disability benefits plan did not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII, California
responded by enacting legislation to protect pregnant workers within the state and make
clear that workers discriminated against on the basis of pregnancy could find a remedy
"5 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. 367, 370 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th
Cir. 1975), reed, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
86 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133. '[he Gilbert Court stated, "[‘...de think, therefore, that our decision in
Geduldig v. Aiello, ... dealing with a strikingly similar disability plan, is quite relevant in deter-
mining whether or not the pregnancy exclusion did discriminate on the basis of sex." Id.
87 Id. at 135.
86
 Id. at 136.
" Id.
w 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
9 ' Id. at 138-39.
92 Id. at 143.
" 5 /d. at 142.
" Id. at 141.
95 Id. at 142. Commentators have criticized the Court's benefits/burdens analysis. "[B]cticks/
burden analyses are notorious for their conceptual difficulties," according to one coinmentator,
Note, Sexual Equality Under the PDA, .supra note 18, at 723; Sheryl McCloud asks, "[w]hy burdens?
Why benefits? The Court offers no substantive notion of equality, of sameness in relevant features,
that justifies economic categorization when the explicit issue is sexual equality." McCloud. Feminism's
Idealist Error, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 277, 304 (1986).
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in state law.96 The law provides unpaid disability leave of up to four months for any
pregnant worker. and guarantees that she can return to the same or a similar job at the
end of her disability. 97 Under the statute, no pregnant worker is forced to take pregnancy
leave, and the total leave time an employee does take can be less than the maximum
four months if the employee's period of actual physical disability is less.98 The statute
only applies to businesses with fifteen or more employees. 99
While California responded to Gilbert with a statute that expressly provides job
protection for pregnant workers, 10° Congress responded by amending Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). 0I Congress
specifically intended the PDA to overrule the holding and disapprove the reasoning of
Gilbert. 1 °2
 Where the Gilbert Court had interpreted Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination as not prohibiting pregnancy discrimination, 103 the first clause of the PDA
enlarged the definition of sex discrimination: "Mlle terms 'because of sex' or 'on the
basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions ....""04 And where the Gilbert Court had found
that Title VII permitted employers to exclude pregnancy coverage from their disability
benefit plans, 1 °5 the second clause of the PDA clarified that such an exclusion is no
longer permitted: "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work . ." 106 It is clear, therefore, from both the language
and the legislative history of the pDA, 1 U 7 that Congress intended to overturn Gilbert and
prohibit the different treatment of pregnancy the Gilbert holding had sanctioned: the
exclusion of pregnancy from an otherwise comprehensive disability benefits plan. 1 °8
In the 1983 case of Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EE0C, 11" the Supreme
Court's first pregnancy discrimination case based on the PDA, the plaintiffs challenged
an employer's health plan that covered all temporary disabilities for male and female
employees, including pregnancy-related disabilities.' to The plan also covered any tern-
" See Review of Selected 1978 California Legislation, 10 PAC. L.J. 247,463 (1979).
97
 CAL. GOVT CODE § 12945 (West 1986). See .supra note 14 for the text of the California statute.
98 Note, California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra: The State of California has Deter-
mined that Pregnancy may be Hazardous to Your Job, 16 GOLDEN GA'L'E U.L. REv. 515,519-20 (1986).
It is important to note that the California statute is not a parental leave law. The statute permits
up to four months leave only if the time is needed to recover from the temporary disabilities
associated with pregnancy and childbirth.
99 CAL. GOVT CODE § 12945(e) (West 1986).
111I} CAL. Gov'r CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1986). See supra note 14 for the text of California's
right to return law.
1 "' See supra note 15 for the text of the PDA.
H. R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & Amin.%
NEWS 4749,4750-51.
1 "3 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
a'4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1985).
1 " Gilbert, 429 U.S. , at 138-39.
116 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(k) (Supp, III 1985).
107 H. R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2c1 Sess. 2-3, reprinter/ in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4749,4750-51.
,"" Id.
"") 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
"" Id. at 671-72.
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porary disabilities suffered by employees' spouses, with the single exception of preg-
nancy,'" As a result, the spouses of female employees received complete health coverage,
while the health coverage for the spouses of male employees was less than complete. I 12
J ustice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that the policy violated the PDA.'"
He noted that Congress enacted the PDA specifically to overturn Gilbert and make
pregnancy discrimination actionable under Title VII."- 0 The Court noted that Title VI1
prohibits all sex discrimination,'" while the PDA prohibits all pregnancy discrimina-
tion." The Newport News policy of providing a less than complete health care plan to
male employees, therefore, constituted sex discrimination under Title V 11, 17 according
to the Court, and the policy excluding pregnancy coverage from the coverage provided
for spouses constituted pregnancy discrimination under the PDA," The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the PDA in Newport News has been the sole guide for Title VII
pregnancy discrimination claims until the Court's ruling in California Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Guerra." 9
In conclusion, the plaintiffs seeking equal treatment for pregnant workers had
mixed success before the Supreme Court. The Court struck down mandatory leave
policies and the loss of seniority for workers on pregnancy disability leave, For too long,
however, the Court clung to the meaningless distinction, established in Geduldig, that
disability benefits plans which excluded pregnancy coverage did not discriminate on the
basis of sex under the Constitution or Title VII because they divided employees into the
permissible categories of pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. Mier the Court
handed down the Gilbert decision, Congress acted to clarify the parameters of pregnancy
discrimination. When it enacted the PDA, Congress resolved the problem of disability
benefit plans that excluded pregnancy coverage. The PDA, however, raised new ques-
tions.
A. Special Treatritent v. Equal Treatment: The Public Policy Debate Concerning Pregnancy in
the Workplace
When Congress enacted the PDA in 1978 in order to give workers recourse against
pregnancy discrimination in the workplace, the legislation it passed resolved the Gilbert
problem of the outright exclusion of pregnancy coverage from disability benefits plans.'"
But the PDA sparked a new controversy. Both courts and commentators struggled to
interpret and reconcile the two clauses of the Act."' The PDA's second clause proved
"' Id. at 672-73.
112 Id. at 676.
Id. at 678.
114 Id .
"5 Id. at 681.
' 16 Id. at 684.
" 7 Id. at 682.
" 8 Id.	 684.
" 9 California Federal, 107 S. C1, 683 (1987).
120 The reaction to Gilbert was swift and sharp. Professor Kay reports that "more than three
hundred groups, including labor unions, feminist groups and some church groups, lobbied for
Congressional repeal of Gilbert." Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, I BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 1,8 (1985).
121 See supra note IS for the text of the PDA. See Note, Sexual Equality Under the FDA, supra
note 18, for a discussion of the different approaches the courts have taken to the PDA. This
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particularly difficult. It provides that pregnant workers shall be treated "the same" as
other workers "similar in their ability or inability to work." Some have interpreted this
language as mandating equal treatment of pregnant workers; they are entitled to no
more and no less than other temporarily disabled workers. Others have focused on the
PDA's first clause, with its broad definition of discrimination, and interpreted it to permit
the special treatment of pregnancy in the workplace.
These different approaches to pregnancy discrimination can be loosely grouped
into two schools of thought. The "equal treatment" advocates interpret the PDA to
require laws which treat pregnant workers identically as other temporarily disabled
workers. 122 The "special treatment" advocates support statutes such as California's right
to return law and urge a reading of the PDA which permits favorable treatment of
pregnant workers. 125 Both the special treatment and the equal treatment advocates are
firmly committed to the goal of equality for women. 124 Yet the differences between the
two approaches reflect fundamental differences in the very idea of women's equality
and the concept of equality itself. These differences are at the heart of the public policy
debate sparked by the California Federal decisions. 125
The equal treatment advocates frame the issue of equality for pregnant workers as
part of the larger problem of providing sufficient health benefits and work leave for all
temporarily disabled employees. 126
 According to the equal treatment advocates, the
commentator describes the equal treatment/special treatment debate as the "assimilationist/pluralist"
debate. Id. at 691.
'" Professor Williams has written most frequently and eloquently in support of the equal
treatment approach. See, e.g., Taub & Williams, Will Equality Require More than Assimilation, Accom-
modation or Separation from the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 825 (1985) [hereinafter
Taub & Williams, Will Equality Require More?]; Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-85) [hereinafter
Williams, Equality's Riddle]; Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Fem-
inism, 7 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 175 (1982) [hereinafter Williams, Equality Crisis].
122 See, e.g., Kay, Equality and Difference, supra note 120; McCloud, Feminism's Idealist Error, supra
note 95; Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action, and the
Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 513 (1983) [hereinafter Krieger & Cooney];
Note, Equality in the Workplace: Is that Enough for Pregnant Workers?, 23 j. FAM. L. 401 (1984-85).
' 24
 Professor Williams has suggested that the core difference between the special treatment and
the equal treatment advocates is one of tactics rather than goals. Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra
note 122, at 378. She explains,
If 1 am right about this, the equal treatment critics part company with the equal
treatment advocates as a matter of tactics rather than ultimate goals. Tactically, the
special treatment advocates may perceive of themselves as defending what they have
(in this case the California and Montana statutes), rather than seeking more at the
risk of ending up with nothing. •
Id. (footnote omitted).
"5
 An examination of the various amicus curiae briefs filed in the California Federal case reveals
the split in the feminist community on this issue. Both sides argued for equality, yet several groups
(including California Women Lawyers, Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace, Betty
Friedan, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, and Los Angeles Feminist Legal Scholars)
urged the Supreme Court to uphold the California statute, while others (including the National
Organization for Women, American Civil Liberties Union, and League of Women Voters) argued
that the statute should only be upheld if it were extended to cover all temporary disabilities for all
employees.
126
 Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 122, at 327. Professor Williams states,
[T]he objective is to readjust the general rules for dealing with illness and disability to
ensure that the rules can fairly account for the whole range of workplace disabilities
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effects of pregnancy discrimination would disappear once all workers receive the health
benefits they need.'" Central to their approach is a belief that pregnancy and childbirth
are analogous to other temporarily disabling conditions, such as a heart. attack or ap-
pendicitis. 128 Indeed, under traditional Title Vii analysis, courts identify discrimination
by comparing the treatment of an individual in the protected group with the treatment
of a similarly situated individual who is not a member of the protected group,129
According to Professor Williams, one of the most important reasons for advocating
the equal treatment approach is to avoid the paternalistic treatment women have received
when the courts have taken their childbearing capacity into account. Professor Williams
observes that when the law has viewed women as different from men because of their
ability to become pregnant, the results have often limited women's employment oppor-
tunities and their freedom of choice in a variety of matters.'" Because taking pregnancy
into account has harmed women in the past, Professor Williams concludes that there are
tremendous risks associated with the special treatment approach."' Most importantly,
that confront employed people. Pregnancy creates not "special" needs, but rather
exemplifies typical basic needs. If these particular typical needs are not met, then
pregnant workers simply become part of a larger class of male and female workers,
for whom the basic fringe benefit structure is inadequate. The solution, in that view,
is to solve the underlying problem of inadequate fringe benefits rather than to respond
with measures designed especially for pregnant workers.
Id.
127 Id.
128
	
at 357. Professor Williams asserts,
[Witten a woman goes into labor, the measures appropriate for someone having a
heart attack won't help; but if both childbirth and a heart attack cause an inability to
work and income loss, it makes sense to encompass both within a disability program
designed to cushion the economic effects of temporary inability to work.
Id. Professor Williams also asks, "loin what basis can we fairly assert, for example, that the pregnant
woman fired by [her employer] deserved to keep her job when any other worker who got sick for
any other reason did not?" Williams, Equality Crisis, supra note 122, at 196. Professor Kay responds,
"Nile short answer to this question is that no male worker who had exercised his reproductive
capacity lost his job as a result," Kay, Equality and Difference, supra note 120, at 35.
129 Krieger & Cooney, supra note 123, at 520-21. As Krieger and Cooney explain, Title VII
disparate treatment analysis relies upon a comparison of "similarly situated" individuals in order to
establish discrimination. Id. "[T]his means that in order to prove discrimination in denial of sick
leave under the PDA [before California Federal], a female employee must show that she was denied
a pregnancy-related leave while a 'similarly situated' person was granted a non-pregnancy related
leave." Id. at 521. As the authors point out, finding this simiarly situated individual is extremely
difficult. Id. Even more difficult is what Krieger and Cooney describe as the "problem of the
strained analogy." Id. at 539, Because pregnancy and childbirth are exclusively female traits, finding
a similarly situated male for comparison depends upon analogy. Id. Thus both courts and corn-
tnentators have attempted to analogize pregnancy to such primarily male medical problems as heart
attack and prostatectomy. Id. at 540. The analogies are simply unpersuasive and ignore both
women's personal experience of pregnancy and childbirth and their social dimension.
' 511 Williams, Equality Crisis, supra note 122, at 177-79. Cases such as Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130 (1873), and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), see supra notes 57-66 and
accompanying text, illustrate what has been described as the "separate spheres" doctrine. Williams,
Equality Crisis, supra note 122, at 178. As Professor Williams explains, according to this doctrine,
women belonged to the private sphere and men to the public sphere: "[t]he public world of men
was governed by law while the private world of women was outside the law, and man was free to
exercise his prerogative as he chose," Id. at 177-78. Clearly women.did not have the same freedom
during this period in history.
" I Taub & Williams, Will Equality Require More?, supra note 122, at 830-32. The authors note
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she believes the modern special treatment advocates approach pregnancy in the same
manner as the Supreme Court did in cases such as Geduldig v. Aiello and General Electric
Co. v. Gilhert. 132
 In those cases, according to Professor Williams, viewing pregnancy as
different and, therefore, requiring special treatment, proved disastrous for women.'"
The equal treatment advocates, in sum, regard pregnancy as similar to other temporary
disabilities. In their view, the solution to pregnancy discrimination is not to establish
unique advantages and protection for pregnant workers but, rather, to ensure that the
law treats all temporarily disabled workers fairly.
The special treatment approach differs from the equal treatment approach in several
fundamental ways. , " The special treatment advocates believe that pregnancy should not
be analogized to other temporary disabilities. 195 In their view, pregnancy is not simply
an illness for which the employee needs time off from work; nor do they regard
pregnancy leave as a "voluntary" separation from work." 6
 Instead, the special treatment
that "[Midges and legislators would be the decisionmakers; their record on discerning what benefits
and what hurts women is uneven, to say the least." Id. at 831 n.25. But where else can women turn
for assistance? After California Federal it is clear that the California legislature and the Supreme
Court have done rather well in discerning what benefits women.
152 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of Geduldig. See supra notes
84-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gilbert.
"3 Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 122, at 366. The similarity between the special treatment
approach and the Geduldig and Gilbert reasoning, according to Professor Williams, is that both define
women as "men plus pregnancy." Id. Thus pregnancy is a special "burden" that women suffer and
men do not. Id. at 366-67. While the special treatment approach thus requires special laws for
women to achieve equality, Professor Williams reminds us that the Geduldig and Gilbert decisions
"squarely rejected the notion that equality means making up for 'women's more burdensome role
in the scheme of human existence. — Id. at 367 (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 139 ii.17 (1976)).
134 See, e.g., Kay, Equality and Difference, supra note 120; McCloud, Feminism's Idealist Error, supra
note 95; Note, Equality in the Workplace: Is that Enough for Pregnant Workers?, supra note 123; Krieger
& Cooney, supra note 123. It is important to note that Professor Kay advocates an "episodic" analysis
of pregnancy that provides, in her view, a middle ground in the equal treatment/special treatment
debate. Because her analysis still calls for treating pregnancy differently from other temporary
disabilities, even for a short period of time, she is grouped with the special treatment advocates.
"5 See, e.g., Kay, Equality and Difference, supra note 120, at 32-37; Krieger & Cooney, supra note
123, at 539-44; Note, Sexual Equality Under the FDA, supra note 18, at 721-22. As Krieger and
Cooney explain, "Rifle capacity to become pregnant is unique to women; it is an inherent, not a
normative sex difference." Krieger & Cooney, supra note 123, at 541. They warn that "the assump-
tion of homogeneity and interchangeability" between women and men in a "society of equals"
establishes a model of equality analytically unequipped "to provide guidance as to the meaning of
equality between two functionally distinct groups." Id. at 540. Phyllis Segal also notes that "[w]hen
so-called neutrality is constructed from the perspective of male dominance, insisting merely on
facially neutral standards is inevitably insufficient to eliminate sex inequality. There is nothing
'equal' in the opportunity of males and females to satisfy such standards." Segal, Sexual Equality, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the ERA, 33 BuFrett.o L. REV. 85, 113 (1984) [hereinafter Segal, Sexual
Equality].
156 Even Professor Williams has recognized a dimension to pregnancy and childbirth that makes
it different than other temporary disabilities:
Some will object that pregnancy is voluntary and its consequences therefore appro-
priately visited exclusively upon the employee. Individual pregnancies may be and
often are voluntary in the sense that the individual woman made a conscious choice
to become pregnant. But, as a social matter, pregnancy is not meaningfully voluntary
any more than eating or sleeping is voluntary. All are basic functions of the human
animal necessary to survival.
Williams, Equality's Riddle, supra note 122, at 354 n.114.
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advocates argue that society needs both the woman worker and the mother,' 37 and that
special treatment is necessary to combat the economic consequences of pregnancy and
childbirth for the pregnant worker and her family.
Special treatment advocates Krieger and Cooney cite statistics that indicate four out
of five female workers may become pregnant while participating in the paid labor
force.' 58 Most of these women will need six weeks or less to recover from the temporary
disabilities associated with pregnancy and childbirth.'" When an employer does not offer
pregnancy disability leave, this omission can be "tantamount to a policy of dismissal for
pregnancy" for most working women.' 40 The lack of job protection for pregnant workers
is at least partly to blame for women's precarious economic position, the special treatment
advocates argue, because a woman must find new employment after the birth of each
child, "thereby losing her seniority rights, wage increases, and promotional and training
opportunities. "L4I In the face of these disturbing facts, the special treatment advocates
believe the law must take pregnancy into account in order to protect the woman worker.
II. CALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION V. GUERRA: THE COURT'S
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, 142 the Supreme Court
upheld a California statute that provides a female employee up to four months of
pregnancy disability leave and reinstatement to the same or a similar job at the end of
the leave) ." California Federal Savings and Loan Association (Cal Fed), an employer,
claimed that under the supremacy clause of the Constitution,'" Title VII, as amended
by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), pre-empted the California statute.''' Cal
Fed claimed that Title VII and the PDA require that employers treat pregnant employees
exactly the same as other employees. 140 In contrast, Cal Fed argued, California's "right
to return" law requires that employers give special benefits to pregnant employees that
other employees do not receive: 117 Given this apparent conflict between the state and
federal law, Cai Fed urged the Supreme Court to invalidate the state law as inconsistent
with and, therefore, pre-erupted by the PDA.'"" Instead, the Court found California's
157 Note, Sexual Equality in the Workplace, supra note 18, at 417. The author notes that "fals a
matter of social policy, however, it seems unwise to treat pregnancy like any other disability. 'Society
expects and demands, and it's a necessity, that women become pregnant. Society both needs the
woman worker and needs the mother.'" Id. (quoting Gorhey, Have a Baby, Lose Your Job, Wash. Post
National Weekly Edition, Apr. 23, 1984 at 7, col. 2-3).
In Krieger & Cooney, supra note 123, at 519 (citing RAMERMAN, MATERNITY AND PARENTAL
LEAVES: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 8 (1980)).
139 Id. (citing KR. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONC. &
ADMIN, NEWS 4749, 4753).
Ho Id,
141 Brief of Amici Curiae — California Women Lawyers, supra note 2, at 6.
142 California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
" 5 Id. at 686-87.
" 4 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI § 2. The Constitution states, "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof' ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
Id.
"I' California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 688.
14111d .
"7 Id,
to Id.
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approach to pregnancy discrimination permissible under Title VII and the FDA's broad
mandate to achieve equal employment opportunity For women."? The Court found
nothing in the language of the California statute that would require or permit any
unlawful employment practice prohibited by Title VII and allowed the law providing
special protection for pregnant workers to stand. 156
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Justice Marsha11, 16 ' addressed the question of
whether California's right to return law' 52 requires employers to treat pregnant workers
in a manner that violates the FDA.'" In order to answer this question, the opinion
focused on general pre-emption principles, the specific pre-emption provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,'" and the legislative history of the PDA. 165 Justice Marshall
began his analysis by stating that when presented with a pre-emption question, the
Court's "sole task" is to ascertain the intent of Congress when it enacted the federal
statute at issue.' 66
Justice Marshall described the three ways in which courts identify congressional
intent to pre-empt state law. First, the Court may find congressional intent to pre-empt
state law when a federal statute's express terms invalidate state law. Second, the creation
of a comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme may establish congressional intent
to pre-empt state law. Finally, if the Court finds a "direct conflict" between the federal
and state statute, even when the federal law does not purport to occupy the field in
question, the Court may permissibly infer congressional intent to pre-empt state law. 16 '
Justice Marshall concluded that the first two types of pre-emption do not apply in
California Federal. He further stated that Congress, when it enacted Title VII, "explicitly
disclaimed" 15H any intent to either pre-empt state law or to occupy the field of employ-
ment discrimination law to the exclusion of state law. 16?
1 " 9 1d. at 694.
' 5° Id. at 694-95.
" 1
 Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor joined in the majority opinion.
152 CAL. Gov"r CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1986). See supra note 14 for the text of the California
statute.
'" See supra note 15 for the text of the PDA.
154 Section 708 of Title VII provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any
State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to
require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (Supp. III 1985).
155
 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4749.
' 56 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 689.
1s>
' 58 Id. at 689.
159 1d. Section 1104 of Title XI, which the Court described as "applicable to all titles of the Civil
Rights Act," id., reads:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion
of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed
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According to the Court, the pre-emption question in California Federal concerns the
third type: pre-emption through conflict with state law.'"° Pre-emption of this kind
occurs, Justice Marshall stated, when "compliance with both federal and state regulation
is a physical impossibility" 161 or when a state law creates an obstacle preventing the
"accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.""
justice Marshall examined Sections 708 and 1104 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 163 and
concluded that Congress intended Title VII to pre-empt state law only in the most
narrow circumstances, when an outright conflict with federal law exists.'" The Court
cited the legislative history of Title VII and the PDA to support its view that Congress
believed state law, as well as federal law, were essential to achieve Title VI I's goal of
equal employment opportunity for women. 163
After finding that Title VII's general pre-eruptive power is limited to only those
circumstances where actual conflict with state law exists, the Court turned to the question
of whether the PDA and California's right to return statute presented such a conflict. 166
The Court relied on its earlier ruling in Newport News Shipbuilding & Thy Dock Co. v.
EEOC to restate its conclusion that Congress enacted the PDA in order to overturn
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. 16 ' Justice Marshall stated that Newport News established that
the first clause of the PDA 166 embodies Congress's intent to overrule Gilbert's reasoning,
while the second clause" embodies Congress's disapproval of Gilbert's holding. 17° Rather
than viewing the PDA's second clause as a limitation on the scope of the first, justice
Marshall stated that the clause simply illustrates the type of pregnancy discrimination
the PDA prohibits. 1 "
The Court also noted with approval the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Newport News in
its conclusion that the PDA establishes a "floor beneath which pregnancy disability
benefits may not drop — not a ceiling above which they may not rise." 172 The legislative
history and historical context of the PDA supports this reading of the Act, the Court
found.'" justice Marshall stated that Congress considered extensive evidence of discrim-
as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any
of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 20001r-4 (Supp. Ill 1985).
16° California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 689-90.
"I Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
162 1d. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
'" 3 Codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-7 and § 2000h-4 (Supp. 111 1985) respectively.
' 64 California Federal, 107:S. Ct. at 689.
Its Id. at 690.
'" Id. at 691.
167 Id. (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U,S. 669 (1983)). For
a discussion of Gilbert, see supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
168 The first clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act reads: "Mlle terms 'because of sex' or
'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions .... " 42 U.S,C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. 111 1985).
169 The second clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act reads: "women affected by preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . ..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1985).
' 7° California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 691.
171 Id.
"2 Id. at 691-92 (quoting California Federal II, 758 F.2d at 396).
173 Id. at 692,
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ination against pregnant workers when it debated the PDA, and the legislative record
contains numerous statements by members of Congress that the PDA would not require
employers to treat pregnant workers differently from other workers. 174
 But, Justice
Marshall noted, not requiring special treatment is different from prohibiting special
treatment. 175
 Because Congress knew that statutes such as California's existed at the time
it enacted the PDA and the PDA's legislative record contains no evidence of congressional
disapproval of these statutes, Justice Marshall concluded that the "clear and manifest
purpose" to pre-empt California's right to return law, and statutes like it, is lacking from
Title VIP 78
The Court found further support for this determination in its observation that Title
VII, as amended by the PDA, and California's right to return law share the same goal:
to provide equality in employment opportunity for pregnant workers.'" Justice Marshall
noted that this common goal protects both the jobs and the families of pregnant workers.
He stated that II* 'taking pregnancy into account,' California's pregnancy disability
leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have families without losing their jobs." 178
The Court distinguished the California statute from the "protective" labor legislation
for women characteristic of an earlier era. Justice Marshall noted that the California
statute is narrowly drawn to cover just the period of "actual physical disability" resulting
from childbirth and, therefore, is not based on "archaic or stereotypical notions about
pregnancy and the abilities of pregnant workers." 179 In answer to Cal Fed's complaint
that it could not comply with both the PDA and the California law, the Court reiterated
that the California statute does not require better treatment of pregnant workers; rather,
it sets a minimum level of protection which employers are free to extend to other workers
or not, as they see fit."
B. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Stevens grounded his concurring opinion in traditional Title VII analysis.
He disagreed with the majority's reasoning that, upheld the California statute based on
general pre-emption principles. 181 Instead, justice Stevens argued that the Court's 1979
decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber182 disposed of the pre-emption question presented
in California Federa1. 183
Weber involved a white employee's Title VII challenge to his employer's voluntary
affirmative action plan which admitted several black employees into a training program
over some white employees with more seniority. 184 The white employee argued that the
language of Title VII prohibits all trace-conscious" employment decisions. 185 The Court
L74 Id.
175 Id. at 692-93.
126 Id, at 693 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,206 (1983)).
[77 Id.
'" Id. at 094 (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,159 (1976)).
179 Id.
"° Id. at 694-95.
' 81 Id. at 695 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"2 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
183 Id. at 695-96 (Stevens, J., concurring).
i" Weber, 443 U.S. at 199.
' 85 Id. at 201.
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in Weber found the affirmative action plan's special treatment of a disadvantaged minority
group permissible under Title VII because it furthered the goal of equal employment
opportunity. 186 Justice Stevens argued that because Weber permits special treatment under
Title VII, the PDA cannot pre-empt the California statute.Ig7 When Congress enacted
the PDA, it incorporated then-existing Tide VII principles and interpretation, Justice
Stevens stated.'" Therefore, Justice Stevens found that the Weber analysis applied to and
resolved the pre-emption issue in California Federal. 18 '-
Whereas Justice Stevens relied upon Weber to uphold California's right to return
law, Justice Scalia in his concurrence found ample support for the California law in one
short provision of Title VII. 19° According to justice Scalia, the Court must look only as
far as Section 708 of the Civil Rights Act, which sets out the pre-emptive scope of the
PDA, to resolve California Federal." Section 708 provides that the PDA pre-empts only
state laws which "purpor[t] to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an
unlawful employment practice" under Title V11) 92 Justice Scalia found nothing in the
California statute's language which requires or permits "any refusal to accord federally
mandated equal treatment to others similarly situated."m Because the California statute
does not require any unlawful employment practice under "any conceivable interpreta-
tion of the PDA,""" Justice Scalia concluded that the California law does not fall within
the pre-eruptive reach of section 708. 195
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice White, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief justice Rehnquist and Justice
Powell, disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the PDA.L" In Justice White's
view, the clear language of the PDA's second clause, which states that women with
pregnancy-related disabilities "shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes," absolutely prohibits the special treatment of pregnant workers. 197 Justice
White disagreed with the majority's interpretation that the holding in Newport News
appropriately applied to this case.'" According to Justice White, Newport News involved
the issue of pregnancy benefits for the wives of male employees and did not directly
implicate the PDA's second clause.' 99 Justice White stated that in a case such as California
Federal, involving female employees, which directly touches the PDA's second clause, the
court should interpret the clause to mean "exactly what it SayS."29°
urn Id, at 208.
"2 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 696 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"" Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 696-97 (Stevens, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (Stipp. 111 1985)).
192 Id. (Scalia, j. dissenting).
195 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195 Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
196 Id. (White, J. dissenting).
192 Id, (White, J. dissenting).
199 Id. (White, J. dissenting).
Id. (White, J. dissenting).
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Justice White also found evidence in the PDA's legislative history to dispute the
majority's holding that the PDA permits preferential treatment of pregnancy."' Justice
White found statements in the legislative record which indicate, in his view, that Congress
did not intend to require employers to provide special benefits for pregnant workers?"
This legislative history, according to Justice White, prohibits states from enacting special
treatment statutes such as California's right to return law. 2os
Justice White viewed the problem of special treatment for pregnant workers as a
"policy dispute" which the Court had no role in resolving."'" It is the Court's role to
interpret the PDA, the justice asserted, and because the PDA's guiding principle is equal
treatment, in justice White's view, California's statute is not permissible."s That Congress
knew that statutes such as California's existed when it enacted the PDA did not, in justice
White's view, rise to the level of an endorsement of those statutes, nor an incorporation
of their approaches into the meaning of the PDA. 206
justice White also disagreed with justice Marshall's conclusion that employers can
comply with both California's law and the PDA. 207 Compliance with the PDA's equal
treatment mandate would require the Court to extend the right to return law to cover
all temporarily disabled employees, justice White stated. Because the California legisla-
ture clearly did not intend that result when it enacted the statute, according to justice
White, the statute must fail. 208 Justice White concluded by stating that Section 708 of
the Civil Rights Act does not save the California law. He stated that the California statute,
by requiring special treatment of pregnancy, authorizes an unfair employment practice
forbidden by Title VII.209
III. TAKING PREGNANCY INTO ACCOUNT TO EXPAND THE BOUNDARIES OF EQUALITY
In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, the Supreme Court Riled
that Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, does not prohibit the
special treatment of pregnancy." The Court sustained California's right to return law
against a pre-emption attack on the grounds that both the California statute and the
FDA share the common goal of furthering women's employment opportunities 2 12 The
Court found no conflict between the two statutes which required pre-emption of the
state statute." Once the Court determined that the PDA did not pre-empt the California
statute, it established a two-pronged test for judging the validity of other state laws that
provide special treatment in the form of job protection for pregnant workers 2 19 In order
201 Id. at 699 (White, J., dissenting).
202 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
203
	 (White, J., dissenting).
204
	 at 700 (White, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 701 (White, J., dissenting).
204
	 at 700 (White, J., dissenting).
207
	 at 701 (White, J., dissenting).
208
	 (White, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 702 (White, J., dissenting).
210 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 695 (1987).
'" CAL. Gov'T CODE § 2945(b)(2) (West 1986). See supra note 14 for the text of the California
statute.
212 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 693.
215 Id. at 694-95.
214 Id. at 694.
July 1987]	 CASENOTE	 803
to be in harmony with federal law, such statutes must limit job protection to just the
period of actual physical disability resulting from pregnancy and childbirth. Further-
more, the statute must have the effect of enhancing the employment opportunities
available to women eniployees. 216 The Court reasoned that such laws will enable women,
as well as men, to have families without the risk of losing their jobs. 216
California Federal marks an important milestone in pregnancy discrimination law. In
permitting the special treatment of pregnancy under the PDA, the Court has removed
the equal treatment obstacle from the path of equal employment opportunity for preg-
nant workers. Although the decision directly affects only four states, 217 state legislatures
can now safely provide additional protection within their jurisdictions for pregnant
workers. The California Federal Court properly refrained from mandating special treat-
ment for pregnant workers, but its decision injects new life into an old debate. By
describing the underlying issue in pregnancy discrimination as a matter of equality
between working women and working men with families, the Court has shaken off a
decade of unfortunate pregnancy discrimination analysis and established a new analytical
framework in its place. The decision represents primarily a symbolic victory for pregnant
workers, but it also lays the groundwork for the continuing development of sexual
equality in the law.
A. The Supreme Court Correctly Determined that Taking Pregnancy Into Account does not
Violate the PDA
When the Supreme Court ruled in California Federal that the PDA did not pre-etnpt
California's right to return law under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, the
Court stated that in order to resolve the pre-emption question, "our sole task is to
ascertain the intent of Congress" when it enacted Title V11. 216 The Court found two
sources for Congressional intent concerning the pre-emptive reach of the PDA: the pre-
emption provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII is a part, and the
legislative history of the PDA. 219
The Civil Rights Act contains two references to pre-emption. The first reference, in
Title VII, makes it clear that the federal law will pre-empt state law only when state law
requires or permits an "unlawful employment practice" as defined by Title V11. 220 The
second reference, in Title XI, states that Congress did not intend the Civil Rights Act
to "occupy the field" of civil rights legislation, and that Congress intended to invalidate
state law only when it is "inconsistent" with federal civil rights law. 22 ' In general, the
Court has held that Title VII was intended to supplement, rather than to supplant, state
law prohibiting employment discrimination. 222 Once the Court established that the PDA
2' Id.
218 Id.
217 Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Montana currently have statutes similar to California's right
to return law. See supra note 9.
2 " California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 689.
219 Id. at 690.
220 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (Supp. Iii 1985). See supra note 154 for the text of this provision.
3V 1 42 § 2000h-4 (Supp. DI 1985). See supra note 159 for the text of this provision.
222 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974). The Alexander Court stated,
IT]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an
individual to pursue independently his [or her] rights under both Title V11 and other
applicable state and federal statutes. The clear inference is that Title VII was designed
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will pre-empt only state law that requires or permits an unlawful employment practice
or is inconsistent with the Act, its next task was to determine whether the preferential
treatment of pregnancy, as required by the California statute, fit either of these two
categories. 223
 To answer this question the Court turned to the legislative history of the
FDA . 224
The PDA's legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress enacted the statute
against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. 225
Because that case held that an employer's disability benefits plan 'which excluded preg-
nancy and childbirth coverage did not violate Title VI l's prohibition against sex discrim-
ination, 226
 the PDA's legislative record contains numerous statements that employers
would no longer be permitted to offer disability plans with this exclusion. 227 The record
also clearly states that the FDA would not require employers to institute pregnancy
disability coverage if the employer has no disability plan for its employees. 228 The PDA
would simply require all existing plans to provide reasonable pregnancy disability cov-
erage.229
Although the PDA's immediate goal was to overturn Gilbert and prohibit the overt
discrimination involved in that case, clearly the statute's long-term goals are to prohibit
all forms of pregnancy discrimination in the workplace and to ensure equal employment
opportunity for women.2" The FDA's first clause, which broadly states that Title VI I's
to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employ-
ment discrimination.
Id. at 48-49.
223 Califonaa Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 691.
22' Id. at 691-93.
223 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4749 [hereinafter Legislative History]. The House
Report noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had issued guidelines under
Title VII that prohibited pregnancy discrimination and that eighteen federal district courts and
"all seven Federal courts of appeals which have considered the issue have rendered decisions
prohibiting discrimination in employment based on pregnancy ...." Contrary to these rulings and
guidelines, however, the Report stated, the Gilbert Court ruled that Title VII did not prohibit the
exclusion of pregnancy from the company's disability benefits plan. Id. at 4750.
225 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976). See supra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Gilbert.
227 Legislative History, supra note 225, at 4752-54. For example, the House Report stated that,
This bill would prevent employers from treating pregnancy, childbirth and related
medical conditions in a manner different from their treatment of other disabilities. In
other words, this bill would require that women disabled due to pregnancy, childbirth
and related medical conditions be provided the same benefits as those provided other
disabled workers. This would include temporary and long-term disability insurance,
sick leave, and other forms of employee benefit programs.
Id.
228 Id. at 4752. The legislative history provides that "HR 6075 in no way requires the institution
of any new programs where none currently exist. The bill would simply require that pregnant
women be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work."
Id.
229 Id.
238
 The legislative history reflects the FDA's overriding goal of employment opportunity in its
emphasis on the PDA's place as part of Title Vii: li]n enacting Title VII, Congress mandated that
equal access to employment and its concomitant benefits for female and male workers, However,
the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Title VII [in Gilbert and Salty] tend[s] to erode our
national policy of nondiscrimination in employment." Id. at 4751.
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terms "'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions," would have been
unnecessary if Congress had intended to limit the PDA. to the Gilbert facts. The general
language Congress chose to use in the PDA's first clause indicates, rather, a desire to
incorporate some flexibility into the statute in order to address future forms of discrim-
ination and future barriers to employment opportunity that women may face in the
workplace.
Once it is clear that the PDA should be read to reach more than simply the exclusion
of pregnancy from disability benefits plans, however, a problem arises in determining
just how far the PDA reaches. As Justice White wisely observed, "most Congresspersons
did not seriously consider the possibility that someone would want to afford preferential
treatment to pregnant workers" when they enacted the PDA. 23 ' Congress's failure to
explicitly endorse the special treatment of pregnancy in the PDA or its legislative history
simply cannot be interpreted to require that the statute which Congress enacted to
protect pregnant workers may be used by employers to deny them this very protection.
Shackling the PDA to an interpretation based solely on Gilbert, as proposed by the
California Federal dissent, ignores both its long-term goals and its place as part of Title
VII. If equal employment opportunity requires the special treatment of pregnancy in
the workplace, and the California legislature determined that. it does, the Court correctly
found that the PDA permits special treatment.
Support for the California Federal majority's interpretation of the PDA comes from
the legislative record. 232 Congress expressly stated that the PDA would not require special
treatment, but never said that it absolutely prohibited special treatment. Congress also
knew that statutes such as California's existed at the time it enacted the PDA and, in the
Court's words, "apparently did not consider them inconsistent with the PDA." 2" The
Court, therefore, read the legislative record as permitting the states to do more in the
area of pregnancy discrimination, it' they wish. 234 This interpretation is sound in view of
the PDA's overriding purpose. Once the Court reached this conclusion concerning the
PDA's long-term goals, its finding that the special treatment of pregnancy does not
constitute an unlawful employment practice, nor in any way contravenes the purposes
of the PDA, naturally followed. 233
The dissent focused on the second clause of the PDA and the Act's legislative history
to support its conclusion that the FDA absolutely prohibits special treatment. 2" Because
the FDA's second clause states that pregnant workers "shall be treated the same" as other
temporarily disabled workers and the legislative history emphasizes equal treatment,
Justice White concluded that the FDA prohibits statutes such as California's right to
return law. 2" This conclusion reflects Justice White's view that the special treatment of
pregnancy is an unlawful employment practice under Title V11. 238 But this belief survives
only by ignoring the PDA's long-term goal of equal employment opportunity by inter-
'2
' 1 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. 683, 699 (1987) (White, J., dissenting),
252 Legislative History, supra note 225, at 4759.
222 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 693 (citing the forerunners of the Connecticut and Montana
statutes which can be found at note 9, supra).
l07 S. Ct. at 692-93.
2" Id. at 693-94.
21" Id. at 698 (White, J., dissenting).
2" Id. (White. J., dissenting).
258 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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preting the PDA's second clause as requiring identical treatment, rather than treatment
that will ensure equality in the workplace.
Justice White further argued that employers cannot possibly comply with both the
PDA and California's right to return law. 239 In his view, the PDA requires equal treatment
of pregnant workers and other similarly disabled workers and the job protection pro-
vided by the California statute must either be made available to all workers, or to none. 24°
The fact that only women become pregnant and need the protection of the California
statute does not enter into his analysis. This omission renders Justice White's dissent a
hollow, formalistic argument. He argues for an essentially meaningless equality standard,
since male employees do not need pregnancy disability benefits.
Justice Stevens added an important ingredient to the issue of interpreting the PDA.
He noted that the PDA is part of Title VII and that traditionally, the Court has inter-
preted Title VII to permit preferential treatment of a disadvantaged class. 24 ' In United
Steelworkers v. Weber, the Court permitted an affirmative action plan to stand even though
it meant a minority employee was admitted into a training program over a white em-
ployee with more seniority. 242 Because Title VII permits this special treatment, Justice
Stevens concluded, Title VII certainly permits the special treatment provided by the
California statute. 243 Justice Stevens' comparison to Weber is important because it links
the California Federal decision with traditional Title VII analysis. When Weber's interpre-
tation of Title VII is considered, the California Federal Court's ruling on the PDA is a
logical and necessary extension of Title VII principles in the area of sexual equality.
The final element in the majority opinion, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v.
EEOC,244 is the only case prior to California Federal to interpret the PDA. The Court
relies on it for its reading of the PDA's two clauses. 245
 The Newport News Court interpreted
the two clauses of the PDA as manifesting congressional intent to overrule General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert. 246 According to Newport News, the FDA's first clause, which provides that
'Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination also prohibits discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy, disapproved the Gilbert reasoning.217 The second clause, which pro-
vides that employers treat pregnancy disability the same as other temporary disabilities,
overruled the Gilbert holding. 248 In California Federal, the Court reiterated this interpre-
tation of the PDA. Newport News serves as the final leg of support in the California Federal
analysis, and the Court properly used the precedent.
Although the language of the PDA appears to require equal treatment of pregnancy
and related disabilities, as Justice Stevens noted, "[t]he Pregnancy Discrimination Act ..
2' 9 Id. at 701 (White, J., dissenting).
24° Id. at 701-02 (Whited., dissenting).
2." Id. at 696 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
See .supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Weber decision.
242 Weber, 442 U.S. at 199.
243 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 696-97.
244 Id. at 691-92 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,678
(1983)).
245 Id. at 691.
24° Id. The Court stated, "[w]hen Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously
expressed its disapproval both of the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision."
Id. (quoting Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678).
247 Id. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of Newport News.
248 107 S. Ct. at 691.
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does not exist in a vacuum." 249 The legislative record reveals a Congress committed to
overruling Gilbert and ensuring that pregnancy would be covered in disability benefit
plans. Congress did not anticipate a day when pregnancy would receive preferential
treatment, and so the PDA's response to such legislation must be divined from other
sources. The California Federal Court relied on basic pre-emption doctrine, general Title
VII principles, and the Newport News analysis of the PDA in order to uphold California's
right to return law. Justice Stevens added the Weber analysis as further support for
permitting special treatment under Title VII. The California Federal ruling is a logical
extension of existing Title VII principles and reflects the Court's commitment to the
PDA's long term goal of achieving equality in women's employment opportunities.
B. The Implications of the California Federal Decision
The most immediate impact of the California Federal decision is its clarification of'
the proper interpretation of the PDA. The Act does not mandate special treatment of
pregnancy, but permits states to enact legislation such as California's right to return law
in order to provide limited job protection for pregnant workers. Because only four
states, including California, currently have such statutes, the Court's decision has a
limited effect on the lives of most working women and men. While the decision opens
the door for more job protection for pregnant workers, it forces no state or employer
to walk through. The ruling has significant symbolic importance, however, because of
the way in which it discusses pregnancy discrimination. The California Federal ruling has
transformed this debate.
Throughout the early sex discrimination case525" and the first pregnancy discrimi-
nation cases, 251 the Court struggled to define the parameters of pregnancy discrimina-
tion. Initially, the Court viewed a woman's childbearing ability as something that made
her different from her male counterpart at work and necessitated special protection. 252
When the era of protective legislation ended and as women entered the workforce in
greater and greater numbers, plaintiffs tried to obtain disability coverage for pregnancy
on the same basis as employer plans covered other temporary disabilities. The Supreme
Court determined that pregnancy was different from other disabilities, however, and it
permitted employers to exclude pregnancy coverage from their otherwise comprehensive
p lans .259
249 Id. at 695 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"° See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the early sex discrimination
cases.
251 See supra notes 66-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pre-PDA pregnancy
discrimination cases,
252 See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the early sex discrimination
cases.
255 In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, Justice Rehnquist described pregnancy in this way:
Pregnancy is, of course, confined to women, but it is in other ways significantly
different from the typical disease or disability. The District Court found that it is not
a "disease" at all, and is often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition.
429 U.S. 125, 1'36 (1976) (citation ommitted). The Geduldig Court's insistence that distinctions based
on pregnancy divided employees into groups of "pregnant women" and "nonpregnant persons"
also illustrates the Court's inability to to see pregnancy and childbirth as part of regular human
experience, and as touching the lives of men, as well. As Christine Curtis, one of the drafters of
California's right to return law, observed, "it is difficult to see how men are harmed by a woman's
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Once Congress enacted the PDA, federal law mandated that at the very least em-
ployers must treat pregnancy the same as other temporary disabilities. The California
Federal ruling has taken this analysis one step further by introducing a new standard for
comparison: both working mothers and working fathers should have the same oppor-
tunities in the workplace. The Court no longer defines pregnancy discrimination through
the often meaningless process of comparing the sex-specific disabilities of men and
women and their respective coverage in health plans. Instead, the Court has shifted the
focus to firmer ground and compares the employment opportunities available to both
male and female employees. If a state legislature determines, as California did, that
pregnant workers require job protection in order to achieve equal employment oppor-
tunity, federal law will not stand in its way.
C. Other States Should Follow California's Lead and "Take Pregnancy Into Account"
As recent statistics demonstrate, the economic situation of most working women and
their families is precarious. Over two-thirds of working women serve as the sole or
primary breadwinners for their families, 254 and in over half of married couples both
spouses work. 255 On the average, women earn about 60% of what men earn in compa-
rable positions 2 56 and 80% of working women earn less than $19,000 annually."' Most
shocking, the National Council on Economic Opportunity estimates that by the year
2000 all of those people living in poverty in our nation will be women and children in
woman-headed households. 258
When an employer offers no job protection for pregnant workers, having a child
can be tantamount to losing one's job. 259 When a woman attempts to re-enter the
workforce after having a child, she often has lost seniority and commands a lower
salary. 26° Lillian D. Garland's story breathes life into these statistics. She planned a short
unpaid pregnancy leave. 26 ' Garland developed complications and delivered by Cesarean
section, however, and her doctor prescribed a three-month leave. 262 When Cal Fed
refused to let her return to work, Garland lost both her apartment and custody of her
daughter to the child's father. 265 The realities of the lives of working women like Lillian
Garland and their child ien should be a matter of great concern. 264
right to return to her job. Indeed, men who have pregnant women in their immediate families
should benefit from the law." Curtis, For Equality of the Sexes, CALIFORNIA LAWYER 15, 16 ( June
1985).
224 Segal, Sexual Equality, supra note 135, at 99 n.82 (citing WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, TWENTY FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS (1982)).
255 /d. at 99 n.81 (citing Waldman, Labor Force Statistics from a Family Perspective, 106 MONTHLY
LAB. REV, 16, 19 (Dec. 1983)).
222 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN AT WORK 28 (1983), cited in
Brief of Amici Curiae — California Women Lawyers, supra note 2, at 6.
227 Dwyer, Business Starts, supra note 4, at 50,
222 Segal, Sexual Equality, supra note 135, at 86 n.6 (citing NAT'L ADVISORY COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY, CRITICAL CHOICES FOR THE 80's 19 (1980)).
222 Brief of Amid Curiae — California Women Lawyers, supra note 2, at 6.
26° Id.
261 Garland's Bouquet, TIME, Jan. 26, 1987, at 14.
262 Id.
263 1d.
264 Krieger and Cooney observe,
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The United States stands alone among modern industrialized nations•in its failure
to provide pregnancy and childcare benefits to working parents. 2" 2 Recent congressional
efforts to provide limited pregnancy disability coverage and parental leave for federal
employees have died in committee, 266 and there is certainly no sign that a federal law
applying to private employers would meet with congressional approval. Meanwhile,
women and children comprise the fastest growing poverty group in the nation. 267
California's right to return law, like the statutes in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and
Montana, attempts to take sonic of the economic sting out of the decision to bear a child.
The Supreme Court has determined that Title VII permits this limited job protection.
Until Congress articulates a national policy, however, states must shoulder the burden
of protecting pregnant workers. No state should shirk this responsibility.
The California Federal decision also represents an important victory for the special
treatment advocates.268 Whereas the equal treatment advocates were concerned that the
special treatment of pregnancy would harm women in the workplace, the Court estab-
lished a test. that requires any special protection to enhance the woman worker's em-
ployment opportunities. And whereas the equal treatment advocates feared a slippery
slope, the Court established a precise and rational test which expressly prohibits any
statute based on archaic stereotypes of women. Most importantly, the California Federal
decision makes it possible for pregnant workers to have a choice when working and
having a family overlap.
The Court's willingness to uphold California's right to return law demonstrates a
commitment to the idea of equality in American law. Ronald Dworkin's analysis of
equality sheds light on the significance. of the California Federal decision. He distinguishes
between every individual's right to equal treatment and an individual's right to be treated
as an equal:
There are two different rights [individuals] may be said to have. The first is
the right to equal treatment, which is the right to an equal distribution of some
opportunity or resource or burden .... The second is the right to treatment
as an equal; . . . to be treated with the same respect and concern as anyone
else .... In some circumstances the right to treatment as an equal will entail
a right to equal treatment, but not, by any means, in all circumstances. 262
Dworkin's analysis presents two ideas about equality. First, in our nation of equals, all
citizens are entitled to a minimum level of equal treatment. And second, this equality
Available statistics probably underestimate the impact of no-leave policies on working
women. A woman may quit to save herself the indignity of being fired once her
employer discovers she is pregnant. Or, prior to becoming pregnant, a woman may
voluntarily remove herself' from the workplace in anticipation of pregnancy. Neither
of these factors would suffice in a statistical analysis of working women.
Krieger & Cooney, supra note 123, at 526 n.42.
2,5 Brief for Human Rights Advocates, at 6-18, California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
107 S. Ct. at 683 (1987).
26' See, e.g., H.R. 925, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The Family and Medical Leave Act was
previously introduced as H.R. 9300, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) and H.R. 2020, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
267 See supra note 258.
268 Sec supra notes 134-41 for a discussion of the special treatment approach to pregnancy
discrimination.
267 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1977) (emphasis in original).
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entitles all citizens to an opportunity to participate, to contribute, and to be taken
seriously.
When the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the PDA did not
pre-empt California's right to return law, it described the federal statute as establishing
"a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop — not a ceiling above
which they may not rise."27° The Ninth Circuit viewed the PDA as a minimum standard
for pregnant workers, or Dworkin's right to equal treatment. But the right to equal
treatment is only half the story. Full equality also requires treatment as an equal. When
the Supreme Court ruled that women, as well as men, should have the right to have
families without the risk of losing their jobs, it completed the story for pregnant workers.
In order for pregnant workers to be treated as equals in the workplace, the Court
said that states may "tak[e] pregnancy into account." 2" Yet historically, that has backfired
for women. The special treatment of pregnant employees may create some of the same
suspicions that accompany affirmative action plans; that women or minorities cannot
"make it on their own," or that they need special help in order to survive in the workplace.
First Weber and now California Federal indicate that those suspicions may be true. Minor-
ities and women may need special treatment, but not for the reasons critics suppose.
just as entrenched and pervasive racism may only disappear with purposeful affirmative
action, a labor market geared toward the male employee may become a place where
women, too, can succeed only with purposeful protection for pregnancy disability.
Clearly California Federal represents an important step forward in the area of preg-
nancy discrimination. The case is not, however, an all-out endorsement of special treat-
ment as the only way to achieve equal employment opportunity. At the time of this
writing, only three states in addition to California have enacted legislation providing
minimal job protection for pregnant workers. 272 Although Congress continues to debate
a parental leave bill that would provide job-protected pregnancy disability leave and
gender-neutral parental leave, 223 the bill has not made significant progress. Just a week
after the Court decided California Federal, it handed down another pregnancy discrimi-
nation case that determined that a pregnant employee had left her job "voluntarily" to
have her child, and therefore did not qualify for unemployment benefits under state
iaw. 274
In this context, California Federal's greatest immediate impact is probably mostly
symbolic. But symbolic victories are victories nonetheless. Professor Karst identified the
symbolic importance of the landmark desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education.
That decision, he suggests, represents a "redefinition of community that would embrace
a previously excluded group. "275 California Federal represents such a redefinition in the
area of sexual equality. For the first time, the Supreme Court has recognized that equality
in the workplace must be defined by comparing the opportunities available to working
272 California Fed. Say. Sc Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985), aff 'd, 107 S. Ct.
683 (1987).
271 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 694 (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159).
272 Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Montana also have statutes similar to California's right to
return law. See supra note 9.
272 See supra note 266.
274
 Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 821 (1987), aff'g 688 S.W.2d
344 (Mo. 1985).
272
 Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447,497-98 (1984).
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mothers and working fathers. All states are now free to follow California's example and
provide reasonable job protection for pregnant workers,
CONCLUSION
California Federal established the principle that employers may treat pregnancy dif-
ferently from other temporary disabilities in order to achieve equal employment oppor-
tunity for women. In finding that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act permits the special
treatment of pregnancy, the Court brought the PDA into harmony with general Title
VII principles. The careful reasoning of the Court and the statement that women, as
well as men, should not have to risk losing their jobs when they have families, indicates
that California Federal is not a step down the slippery slope of the protectionism of the
past but, rather, an enlightened, humane response to the very real needs of women in
the workplace. There is much to celebrate and little to fear in this important decision.
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